How far do you agree with the view that Truman’s decision to intervene in Korea was a
spontaneous response to an unexpected invasion? (25)
The spontaneousness of Truman’s decision and the expectedness of the invasion was arguably
interconnected by other concerns and actions of the US, the USSR, China, North Korea and South
Korea. There were evidences suggested Truman’s response was largely spontaneous, whereas
the invasion was expected in the long term but not short term, hence becoming an unexpected
invasion at the time.
It can be argued that some actions by Truman suggested his decision was not a spontaneous
response, and the invasion was neither unexpected to Truman. Early in 1950, Truman
commissioned the National Security Council and produced the NSC-68, in which it was a classic
Cold War document claiming that the USSR had a ‘fanatic faith’ and that its leaders wanted total
domination of Europe and Asia, therefore, we can inferred that the invasion from the North Korea
was expected by the US because it was believed that the USSR was supportive of the invasion
behind the North Korea. Moreover, the NSC-68 included recommendations such as the
development of a hydrogen bomb to resist Communism attempts at world domination, the build-up
of American conventional forces in order to enable the USA to fight limited wars abroad, in which it
made it easy to see the US and Truman was ready to intervene in Korea of an expected war. This
is supported by Extract 2, ‘The Americans had a good general idea of what was coming and had
their countermeasures prepared.’ Hence, arguably Truman’s decision was not a spontaneous
response but a long-prepared response to an expected invasion.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that Truman’s decision was spontaneous because he did not ask
for a declaration of war and this later caused him great political difficulties and gave his opponents
the opportunity to call the Korean War ‘Truman’s War’. It can also be argued that...