Jus Post Bellum
Recently, there has been a renewed interest concerning the ethics of war
and peace. This heightened attention seems to have been caused by at least
two factors. The first factor would be the occurrence of several quite
destructive political conflicts in recent history, notably the Persian Gulf War
of 1991 and the civil wars in Somalia (1992–94), Bosnia (1992–95) and
Rwanda (1994–95).1 Indeed, in response to the latter two conflicts, the
United Nations has inaugurated, at The Hague, the first International War
Crimes Tribunals since the end of World War II. There has, accordingly,
been a great deal of public attention focused on considering what, if anything,
is permitted, and what punishable, in times of war.2 The second factor
that seems responsible for the renewed focus on the ethics of war and peace
appears more strictly theoretical. Heated and fascinating academic debate,
over the past decade, regarding such issues as deontology versus
consequentialism, the (in)violability of persons, and the nature of human
rights, has gradually led prominent scholars toward the central questions
surrounding the ethics of war and peace, such as when, if ever, may we kill
persons, and on what grounds? And, if we may, by what means are we permitted
to do so? Above all, how do the rights of persons figure in such an
inquiry? Much of the most recent debate has, accordingly, focused on the
conflict between just war theory, which permits the resort to killing and
warfare under certain circumstances, and pacifism, which refuses ever to
offer such permission.3
In this article, I shall not be dealing with this central, and important,
theoretical struggle. Indeed, I shall be assuming the basic truth of some
form of just war theory: that there are certain circumstances in which states
may justifiably resort to the use of armed force. The aim here, rather, is to
contend that just war theory, as currently conceived, is incomplete. Just
war...