Toyota Manufacturing Case
October 10, 2008
1. Where, if at all, does the current defect handling methodology for defective seats deviate from TPS and Lean?
This is a violation of many Toyota Production System and lean principles. Below is a list of the most significant deviations from those principles:
• Jidoka: Make any production problems instantly self-evident and stop production whenever problems are detected. Currently, they are not stopping production for these defects.
• Normal state of operation well characterized and understood- defects are not a normal state of operation, but operators in the seat area have come to consider themn “normal”
• “Let’s go and see” – a problem of this significance should have drawn senior leadership attention to the plant floor at the site of the problem much earlier
• 5 Why’s root cause analysis- basic thorough 5 why problem solving analysis has not occurred even though the problem has been pervasive for some time. If the 5 why methodology had been employed the true root cause should have been understood prior to Friesen’s involvement.
• Rise in backseat andon cord pulls- per exhibit 10 these pulls rose throughout April. Significant rise in the number of backseat andon cord pulls should have signaled problems higher and higher in the organization until the problem was rapidly solved. Without immediate attention to andon cord pulls, that “learning opportunity” is lost.
• Build quality into the product on the line- In this case, defects are being passed down the line, and poor quality is being installed into the vehicle. It is both an immediate problem, but also a bigger cultural learning that says to line personnel, defects have become OK and a normal part of operations.
• 8 cars in clinic area- should have triggered a “code 1” shutdown and the line should have stopped. Then assistant managers should have gathered to devise countermeasures. With 18 cars in defect area, says...