Leo Tolstoy’s account of the battle of Borodino is very interesting, not because of the information that is provided, but the delivery of the text is presented in a way that you would believe he was there. His use of dialogue and detail is comparable to the first-hand accounts of Jakob Walter, Lt. H.A. Vossler, and Boris Uxkull. Due to the fact that Tolstoy’s account in War and Peace is so similar to the diaries, those first-hand accounts complement and prove Tolstoy’s theories on different aspects of Borodino. One of the more interesting aspects of this campaign was the choice to defend Borodino. After the Russian army retreat from Smolensk, they bypassed a lot of very attractive positions to regroup and prepare for the French to advance. Instead General Kutuzov decided to forgo those places and set up in Borodino. Historians say that Borodino was the best place to set up a defensive position, Tolstoy however, has a different explanation as to why Kutuzov set up in Borodino. Tolstoy states, “The Russians did not seek out the best position but, on the contrary, during the retreat passed many positions better than Borodino. They did not stop at one of these positions because Kutuzov did not wish to occupy any position that he did not choose himself, because the popular demand had not yet expressed itself strongly enough…” (Tolstoy ch.19) It is unfortunate for an army to lose such a decisive battle due to the arrogance of its leader. In Boris Uxkull’s he talks about the retreat from Smolensk and how they pass through multiple cities until finally landing in Borodino (Uxkull 77, 79). Although Uxkull doesn’t mention specifically the potential defensive positions that these places could offer, but one must assume that these places were more fit for battle than Borodino. Not only was Borodino not suitable for battle, the Russian army prepared very little for battle. As Tolstoy mentions, there were no entrenchments and weak flanks (Tolstoy ch.19), so with Russia...