1. Background. The optimum setting for US-Soviet negotiations, particularly at the Summit, would be one in which Soviet offensive weapons had already been removed from Cuba. This may not be feasible. If so, the question of how to undertake negotiations with the Soviets will present itself against the background of either:
(a) Soviet acceptance of some proposal involving cessation of Soviet site construction and perhaps of Soviet shipping to Cuba; or
(b) ascending US economic and military pressures on Cuba.
These two alternatives are not wholly mutually exclusive. The actual situation may include both some diplomatic progress and some increased US pressure.
2. Basic Strategy. Our purpose, in negotiations, should be:
(a) To afford the Soviets face-saving cover, if they wish, for a withdrawal of their offensive weapons from Cuba.
(b) To pave the way, if the negotiations fail, for expanded US economic or military action to remove the weapons.
(c) To use the crisis to reach agreement on other measures that would, in any case, be in our interest.
3. Allied Interests. In pursuing these purposes:
(a) We must have full and intimate consultation with our allies.
(b) It is essential to avoid any implication that we are trading off pre-crisis allied or US interests to secure removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba.
5. Prior Action. Before any negotiation opens, we should take two actions to help set the stage:
(a) Assuming that negotiations take place before the Cuban issue is settled, we should make clear that, if negotiations do not succeed, we will take early action to remove Soviet offensive weapons.
(b) We should seek an immediate allied decision in principle to set up the small pilot NATO Southern Command multilateral seaborne force (Italians, Turks, Greeks, US, and perhaps Canadians) proposed by Ambassador Finletter in Polto 506,(1) and we should make clear our intent to provide interim coverage with...